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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~I. KENNETH WHITE, ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-YS.- Case No. 7652 
SALT LAKE CITY, a ~lunicipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. ; 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The judgment appealed from in this case is a judg-
ment of dismissal on the merits pursuant to a motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint. The Plaintiff's 
property is described in his complaint as being certain 
lots in two subdivisions situated in Salt Lake County out-
side the limits of Salt Lake City. These lots abut on both 
sides of a dedicated avenue and street, namely Marie 
Avenue and Valley Street. It is alleged, as a conclusion, 
that Plaintiff's ownership of these lots includes the 
Avenue and Street, subject only to a dedication of said 
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streets for street purposes, a width of sixty-six feet. It 
is alleged that Defendant City installed a forty-eight 
inch water main in these streets to serve its inhabitants 
without Plaintiff's consent, which main will not benefit 
Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff is damaged thereby because 
he will have to lay two sets of water pipes and gas pipes 
to serve the property. It is further alleged that the prop-
erty as a· residential subdivision will be materially re-
tarded. Just what is meant by this latter statement is not 
clear. Plaintiff prayed for a decree compelling Defend-
ant to remove the main and for damages in the sum of 
$30,000.00 for the unlawful appropriation and trespass. 
It is not alleged that the use of these streets by the City 
for its main was without the consent of the Board of 
County Commissioners. 
Plaintiff relies on two points for a reversal. In 
answer thereto, Defendant relies upon the following 
propositions : 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
UNDER CHAPTER 5, TITLE 78, U. C. A. 1943, AND 
RELATED STATUTES, THE FEE TO THESE DEDICATED 
STREETS, BOTH SURF ACE AND SUB SURF ACE, IS IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUB-
LIC FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES, SUBJECT TO DEFEASANCE 
UPON BEING VACATED THROUGH PROPER PROCEED-
INGS AS IN SAID CHAPTER PROVIDED. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
POINT II 
THE LAYING OF THE WATER MAIN BY DEFEND-
ANT IN THESE STREETS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE WHICH PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO PREVENT OR FOR WHICH HE IS ENTITLED 
TO COMPENSATION. 
POINT III 
EVEN THOUGH THE ABUTTING OWNER OWNS TO 
THE CENTER OF THE STREET, STILL THE LAYING OF 
THE WATER MAIN IN THE STREET DOES NOT GIVE 
HIM A RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES OR TO REQUIRE 
ITS REl\iOV AL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER CHAPTER 5, TITLE 78, U. C. A. 1943, AND 
RELATED STATUTES, THE FEE TO THESE DEDICATED 
STREETS, BOTH SURF ACE AND SUB SURF ACE, IS IN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PUB-
LIC FOR PUBLIC PURPOSES, SUBJECT TO DEFEASANCE 
UPON BEING VACATED THROUGH PROPER PROCEED-
INGS AS IN SAID CHAPTER PROVIDED. 
The subject of public highways or streets located in 
an area in the county outside incorporated cities and 
towns is covered, so far as here rna terial, in three differ-
ent places in our present code. Because of this segregated 
treatment of the matter, some confusion and some ap-
parent inconsistencies may be thought to exist. The three 
places in the code dealing with this subject are (1) Chap-
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ter 1, Title 36 and Chapter 3, Title 36, covering the sub-
ject of "Highways," (2) Chapter 5, Title 78, covering 
"Plats and Subdivisions," and ( 3) Sections 19 to 42, 
Chapter 5, Title 19, covering the powers of County 
Commissioners. 
Plaintiff has chosen to rely entirely on Sections 36-
1-1 and 36-1-7, under the title "Highways." These same 
sections, and Section 36-1-2, are first found in Chapter 
XIII C. L. 1888, where they read, respectively, as follows: 
"Section 2065. That all roads, streets, alleys, 
and bridges laid out or erected by the public are, 
highways." 
"Section 2066. All roads, streets, alleys and 
bridges laid out by others than the public and 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
are, highways. A highway shall be deemed and 
taken as dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously and unin-
terruptedly used as a public thoroughfare for a 
period of ten years." 
"Section 2071. By taking or accepting land 
for a highway the public acquires only the right 
of way, and incidents necessary to enjoy and main-
tain it. A transfer of land bounded by highway 
passes the title of the person whose estate is trans-
ferred to the center of the highway." 
Section 2065 and 2066, above quoted, were combined 
In the 1898 Compiled Laws in the language now con-
tained in Section 36-1-1 U. C. A., 1943. 
The legislation dealing with "Plats and Subdivi-
sions" was not enacted until 1890, Laws of Utah 1890, 
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page 76, and then only related to platting of lands in 
to,vns and did not provide for approval of the plat by 
the to"~n officials. It made it lawful for an owner to 
lay out and plat land into lots, streets, alleys, public 
places. The O"\Yner "\Yas required to make an accurate 
map or plat showing the areas intended for avenues, 
streets, lanes, alleys, commons or other public places, 
also the lots intended for sale by number and the precise 
length and width. The map or plat was to be a_cknowl-
edged by the owners and certified by the surveyor mak-
ing such plat, and was to be filed and recorded in the 
office of the County Recorder. All these provisions, 
with only minor changes, are now contained in Chapter 
5, Title 78, U. C. A., 1943, the present law adding the 
requirement that the plat be approved by the city, town 
or county authorities, depending upon the location of the 
platted lands. Section 4 of the 1890 act provided: 
"Section IV. Such maps and plats when 
made, acknowledged, filed and recorded with the 
county recorder shall be a dedication of all such 
avenues, streets, lanes, alleys, commons or other 
public places or blocks, and sufficient to vest the 
fee of such parcels of land as are therein ex-
pressed, named or intended for public uses for the 
inhabitants of such town and for the public for 
the uses therein named, or intended." 
This same section, Section 78-5-4, now reads as 
follows: 
"Such maps and plats, when made, acknowl-
edged, filed and recorded, shall operate as a dedi-
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cation of all such streets, alleys and other public 
places, and shall vest the fee of such parcels of 
land as are therein expressed, named or intended 
for public uses in such county, city or town for 
the public for the uses therein named or intended." 
The act of 1890 did not provide for vacating any plat 
or portion or street therein. This was enacted in Laws 
of Utah, 1894, page 14, and provided for vacating by 
petition of the owners of the land contiguous or adjacent 
to any street or alley sought to be vacated presented to 
the city council or to the county commissioners. These 
provisions are found in Sections 78-5-6, 7 and 8, U. C. A., 
1943. 
Under these statutory provisions no distinction is 
made between dedicated streets in the city, on the one 
hand, and dedicated streets in counties outside cities, 
on the other hand; as to each the fee passes one to the 
city, the other to the county and both continue until 
vacated by the city or county legislative body upon peti-
tion. The rights of abutting ·owners of each of such 
streets must be the same. If, under these provisions, an 
abutting owner in a city has no present ownership in the 
street, such as would entitle him to prevent the laying 
of a water main in the street, then an abutting owner 
in a county must be also in the same position. So that 
any distinction which some of the cases seem to draw 
between the rights of abutting owners in the street in a 
city and a street in a county outside of a city has no ap-
plication in this case. 
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The approval of the plat by the city or town author-
ities, if in a city or town, or by the county authorities, 
if in the colmty, ''Tas first enacted in the 1898 Compiled 
La"Ts, Section 2013. This is the first time that land in 
the county is mentioned for platting. But Section 2014, 
C. L. 1898, continues Section IV, Laws of 1890, page 76 
in its identical language as above quoted, saying nothing 
about the vesting of the title for the inhabitants of the 
county, stating only that it vests for the "inhabitants of 
such town and by the public." 
Section 1116, C. L. 1907, provided, "That a road not 
used or worked for a period of five years ceases to be 
a highway." This is the provision which was involved 
in the case of Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, S·ection 36 
Utah 127, 104 P. 111, cited and relied upon by Plaintiff. 
This provision was eliminated in the Laws of 1911, page 
287. This amendment indicates that a highway is not 
something limited to mere passage over its surface and 
that a failure to use it or work it works an abandonment 
of the county's interest in the street. 
Since 1888, there have also been some changes made 
in the powers given to the County Commissioners over 
highways. In C. L. 1888, S·ection 187 ( 5) their powers 
over roads were expressed as follows: 
"To lay out, maintain, control, and manage 
public roads, turnpikes, ferries and bridges within 
the county." 
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In the 1896 Laws, page 521 and following pages, the 
Board of County Commissioners was given power, in 
addition to the powers stated in the 1888 Compiled Laws 
above quoted, the power (p. 530) "To grant franchises 
along and over the public roads and highways for all 
lawful purposes," and to "enact all laws, ordinances, and 
regulations not in conflict with the laws of the state, for 
the control, construction, alteration, repair, and use of all 
public roads and highways in the county." These two 
provisions have been continued as Sections 19-5-39 and 
42, U. C. A. 1943. 
The power to permit the laying of water pipes in 
highways was given to the county commissioners in the 
1909 Laws, page 219 (Sec. 5) in the following language: 
"Water mains, sewers and sewer pipes may be 
laid by permission or upon the order of the board 
of county commissioners, and shall be located in 
the roadway section of the highway, at a suffi-
cient depth to keep the roadway secure and to 
prevent a nuisance thereon; but no excavation for 
such purposes shall be made in any public high-
way etc., without first obtaining consent of the 
board of county commissioners." 
Practically the same language is now contained in 
Section 36-3-3, U. C. A. 1943. The 1909 act also grants 
power to county commissioners to permit telephone, 
telegraph, electric light and railway trolley or other poles 
along curb lines of public highways. This provision 1s 
now found in Section 36-3-4, U. C. A. 1943. 
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This history clearly indicates an ever expanding 
legislatiYe consciousness that the purpose of public high-
'Yays, either in incorporated cities or towns or in the 
county, is to meet the ever increasing public uses as our 
civilization and mode of living change in form. No longer 
is a public highway confined to mere convenience for 
passage over its surface by persons, vehicles and animals. 
The air above and the subsurface are now to be utilized 
in the transporting of the various facilities and agencies 
that form a part of our economical, social and political 
life. 
Furthermore an iinportant distinction has grown up 
in this legislation, judging by the language used, between 
ordinary county roads or highways and streets and ave-
nues created by platting a subdivision. Although the 
legislature has seen fit to retain the old language "by 
taking or accepting land for a highway the public ac-
quires only the right of way and incidents necessary to 
enjoy and maintain it," (Sec. 36-1-7) claimed by Plain-
tiff to be a mere right of passage over the surface, it has, 
nevertheless, by other express provisions, enlarged the 
uses that may be made of a highway, as above outlined. 
In addition it has made specific and special provisions 
as to the kind of title which is acquired by the municipal 
authorities, including a county, over or in streets in ac-
cepting a platted subdivision. When the whole of Chap-
ter 5, Title 78, is considered it is apparent that the legis-
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lature intended that the city or county acquires more 
than a mere surface right, a right of passage over the 
surface of the streets, when a subdivision is platted. 
When the language of Section 78-5-4, U. C. A. 1943, 
above quoted, is analyzed it is apparent that regardless 
of where the fee to the corpus of the street may be said 
to vest, the county is vested with a fee title to the street 
for all the public purposes which a street is intended to 
serve, and, such fee vesting in the county, the abutting 
owner is precluded from asserting any right to object 
to such uses or to collect compensation or damages be-
cause of such uses. The foregoing proposition is sup-
ported and amplified in the case of Smith v. Central 
Power Company, 103 Ohio 681, 137 N. E. 159 where the 
court says: 
"The title, rights, and uses of a municipal 
corporation in streets, alleys, and other public 
places rest in part at least in legislative provi-
sions. This is more especially true of dedications 
of streets and alleys made by persons laying out 
subdivisions or additions to municipal corpora-
tions. Sections 3580 to 3592, General Code, both 
inclusive, make full provision for such additions 
and subdivisions, and it is provided in section 3585 
as follows: 
"'The map or plat so recorded shall there-
upon be a sufficient conveyance to vest in the 
municipal corporation the fee of the parcel or par-
cels of land designated or intended for streets, 
alleys, ways, comn1ons, or other public uses, to be 
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held in the corporate name in trust to and for the 
uses and purposes in the instrun1ent set forth 
and expressed, designated, or intended.''' 
The case of Edison Illunzination Company v. Michi-
gan, 200 :Jiich. 11-!, 166 N. \\T. 944 also supports this 
proposition. In this case the Plaintiff brought suit to 
recover damages to its gas pipes laid in a public alley. 
Defendant, in excavating for a building, damaged these 
p1pes. "\V ... e quote from the opinion as follows: 
. ~'The last clause of Section 28, of Article 8, 
(constitution) reads as follows: 
" 'The right of all cities, villages, and town-
ships to the reasonable control of their streets, 
alleys, and public places is hereby reserved to 
such villages, cities and townships.' 
"The present statute relating to town plats 
vests the fee of streets and alleys in the city or 
village within the corporate limits of which the 
land platted is included, or if not included within 
the limits of any incorporated village or town, 
then in the township within the limits of which it 
is included, in trust to and for the uses and pur-
poses therein designated. It has been held by this 
court that whatever the nature of the title of the 
municipality in streets and alleys (whether a fee 
simple or only a conditional fee, or a perpetual 
easement), it is such as to entitle the public 
authorities to devote them to public purposes. Up-
on the vacation of the street or alley the title 
reverts to the abutting owners. 
"We are dealing here with an existing public 
alley. Before the vacating of an alley, what the 
interest of the abutting owners may be, whether 
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more than that of a possibility of reverter, we do 
not decide. He has the right of ingress and egress 
to and from his lot. Manifestly, the fee is in the 
municipality in trust for the public. 
"The dedication must be understood as made 
and accepted with the expectation that the street 
or alley may be required for other purposes than 
those of passage and travel merely, and that under 
the direction and control of the public authorities 
it is subject to be appropriated to all the uses to 
which city streets or alleys are usually devoted, 
as the wants or conveniences of the public may 
render necessary or important. In Village of 
Manchester v. Clarks, 162 N.W. 115, Justice said: 
" 'That public alleys involve easements in the 
nature of ways for the installation of water pipes, 
sewers and other urban services for the general 
welfare, under municipal regulation is well set-
tled.' 
"We are clearly of the opinion that the De-
fendant had no right to interfere with any struc-
ture rightfully in the alley. That the mains and 
conduits in question have been lawfully and prop-
erly placed in the alley by authority of the city is, 
we think, too clear for controversy. The Defend-
ant made excavation into the alley at his peril." 
McWethy v . .Aurora Electric Light d!; Power Co., 202 Ill. 
218, 67 N. E. 9, is also in point here. 
This was an action to enjoin Defendant from erect-
ing and maintaining its system of electrical conductors 
above and under the ground in the streets and alleys of 
the City of Aurora. Plaintiffs were abutting property 
owners. They contended they were entitled to enjoin a 
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construction and use of the street for purely private 
commercial purposes, as distinguished fron1 a construc-
tion or a use of the street to facilitate public travel, such 
as for street rail"Tays, hacks, steam railroads, etc. The 
court dismissed the petition, saying: 
"That it (use for conducting electricity) is a 
different use (fro1n travel) is true, but that it is, 
in principle, distrnguishable from the other ob-
struction mentioned, or that it is for purely pri-
vate commercial purposes is not true. That the 
Company would derive gain from their use in no 
\vay distinguishes them from street railways or 
other means of public travel. In all such uses 
private gain accrues to the individual or corpo-
ration operating them. Since the discovery and 
use of electricity for lighting purposes, it has 
generally if not universally, been held that, the 
fee to public streets being in a municipality, with 
general power to regulate the use of the same, 
such municipality may lawfully authorize private 
corporations or individuals to erect electric light 
poles on its streets, and stretch wires upon them, 
in order to provide lights for its own use, and 
that of its citizens, provided that in doing so they 
do not materially obstruct the ordinary use of the 
streets for public travel. 
"In State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548, 31 S. W. 
784, 34 S. W. 51, 35 S. W. 1132, 34 L.R.A. 369, 
the supreme court of that state uses the following 
clear and comprehensive language : 
"'The power to regulate the use of streets 
is very comprehensive. The word 'regulate' is one 
of very broad import. Under the power thus 
delegated it cannot now be questioned but that 
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the municipal authorities can permit the use of 
the surface for stringing electric wires, for the 
transmission of messages, and the creation of 
light, and may also permit the laying of water 
and gas pipes and sewers beneath the surface. 
These uses are all of a public nature, and are 
not inconsistent with the public use to which the 
streets were dedicated. Under its general power 
to regulate the use of streets the City has author-
ity to authorize corporations or persons for the 
purpose of serving the public, to string telegraph, 
telephone, or electric wires upon poles above the 
surface of the streets, provided such construction 
and mechanical appliances do not materially inter-
fere with the ordinary uses of the street and pub-
lic travel thereon.' 
"Nor does the right of an abutting property 
holder to main~ain a bill for injunction in such 
cases depend upon the question whether or not the 
new use of the street has been legally authorized 
by the municipality. It is also to be observed that 
an obstruction in the nature of a public improve-
ment placed in the streets of a city by the per-
mission of the city, either expressed or implied, 
is strictly a matter between the city and the pri-
vate corporation constructing the improvement, 
so that any action to test the right to obstruct 
the street should be brought by the city, or by 
some public officer on behalf of the city. 
"The fee of the streets is in the city. Cities 
are given exclusive control over the streets and 
alleys within their corporate limits. It follows, 
as a general rule, that a court of equity will not 
interfere with the city's control over the use of its 
streets, unless the exercise of such powers by the 
city is abused to the oppression of persons or 
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corporations· having rights in the street, or unless 
the action of the city in such respect is fraudulent, 
or grossly "~rong or unjust. The reason upon 
which this doctrine rests is so apparent and has 
been so frequently pointed out by this and other 
courts, that to repeat it now is wholly unneces-
sary." 
In arguing point two hereinafter, we will cite and 
quote from cases which we feel also sustain our position 
under point one. 
Plaintiff quotes certain language from Sowadzki v. 
Salt Lake County, Supra. The only question before the 
court in that case was, as stated later in the case of 
Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 Utah 501, 126 P. 959, by the same 
judge who wrote the opinion: "Whether the alleged high-
way had been abandoned as a public easement or high-
way * * * It was there held that by virtue of Compiled 
Laws of 1907, Section 1116, the alleged highway had 
been abandoned as a public easement or highway." The 
statute then provided that a road not used or worked for 
a period of five years ceases to be a highway. The lan-
guage of the court in Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 
quoted by Plaintiff, that "only the fee to the surface 
passed" was wholly gratuitous, and was made without 
any reference to, or consideration of, the other statutes 
above referred to providing for subsurface use of high-
ways for water mains and sewers and for telephone and 
telegraph poles and other uses that would necessarily 
occupy the subsurface of the highway. Furthermore, the 
court did not have before it, and was not considering, 
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any question as to the purposes for which a highway 
may be used or what would constitute a servitude which 
an abutting owner could prevent and for which he would 
be entitled to damages. And finally, the statutes, Section 
36-3-3, U. C. A. 1943, authorizing the laying of water 
mains in highways was not enacted at the time the case 
was tried, being enacted in 1909. 
POINT II 
THE LAYING OF THE WATER MAIN BY DEFEND-
ANT IN THESE STREETS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE WHICH PLAINTIFF IS EN-
TITLED TO PREVENT OR FOR WHICH HE IS ENTITLED 
TO COMPENSATION. 
In support of this proposition, we cite and rely upon 
the following authorities in addition to those already 
cited. 
Smith v. Central Power Company, 103 Ohio 681, 
137 N. E. 159, heretofore quoted from. 
Here Plaintiff brought action against the City of 
Bucyrus and the Power Company to enjoin the placing 
of high voltage electric pole lines along Southern Ave-
nue on which Plaintiff's property abutted. It was claimed 
that the use of the street for high voltage wires was an 
added burden upon Plaintiff's enjoyment of his property 
and that it was a menace to the lives and property of the 
residents along this Avenue. The franchise given to the 
Power Company by the City was not confined to those 
facilities for rendering service to the City and its in-
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habitants, but by the tern1s of the Ordinance the lines for 
the distribution of electric energy could be used to serv-
ice persons, fir1ns, and corporations beyond the limits 
of the City. The rourt dismissed the action. vV e quote 
extensively from the opinion. 
HThe title, rights, and uses of a municipal 
corporation in streets, alleys, and other public 
places rest in part at least in legislative provi-
sions. This is more especially true of dedications 
of streets and alleys made by persons laying out 
subdivisions or additions to municipal corpora-
tions. Sections 3580 to 3592, General Code, both 
inclusive, make full provisions for such additions 
and subdivisions, and it is provided in section 3585. 
as follows: 
"'The map or plat so recorded shall 
thereupon be a sufficient conveyance to vest 
in the municipal corporation the fee of the 
parcel or parcels of land designated or in-
tended for streets, alleys, ways, commons, 
or other public uses, to be held in the corpo-
rate name in trust to and for the uses and 
purposes in the instrument set forth and ex-
pressed, designated, or intended.' 
"Nowhere in the record in this cause does it 
appear in what manner Southern Avenue was 
dedicated to the public use, or whether it was ac-
quired by condemnation proceedings, neither are 
we put in possession of any particular conditions 
or reservations to such dedication, and it will 
therefore have to be presumed that the public has 
such rights in Southern Avenue as are provided 
in section 3585, as said section has been construed 
by former decisions of this court. 
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"Further statutory provision is found in sec-
tion 3714, General Code, which provides: 
" 'The council shall have the care, super-
vision and control of public highways, streets, 
avenues, alleys, sidewalks, public grounds, 
bridges, aqueducts, and viaducts, within the 
corporation, and shall cause them to be kept 
open, in repair, and free from nuisance.' 
"Still further provision is found in the chap-
ter of enumeration of powers of municipalities, 
relating more especially to electric wires and 
equipment, in section 3637, General Code, which 
reads in part as follows : 
" 'And * * * to regulate the construction 
and repair of wires, poles, plants and all 
equipment to be used for the generation and 
application of electricity,' etc. 
"In Section 3809, General Code, it is provided 
that a city council may: 
" 'contract with any person, firm or company 
for lighting the streets, alleys, lanes, squares 
and public places in the municipal corpora-
tion,' etc. 
"Practically the same provision is found in 
section 3994, General Code, which reads: 
"'A municipal corporation may contract 
with any company for supplying, with elec-
tric light, natural or artificial gas, for the 
purpose of lighting or heating the streets, 
squares and other public places and buildings 
in the corporation limits.' 
"In the case at bar the city of Bucyrus cannot 
be supplied with electric energy without the set-
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ting of poles for the purpose of stringing the trunk 
lines thereon, and also for the purpose of string-
ing the distributing wires over the streets and 
alleys throughout the c1ty. In order to have the 
convenience of electricity throughout cities gener-
ally, it is necessary that the electric energy should 
be transported by means of wires over the streets, 
alleys, and public places. It would be manifestly 
impossible to keep entirely on private property. 
"It must be admitted that the decisions here-
tofore have not been uniform. The earlier deci-
sions did not have to deal with the complex and 
modern uses to which streets and highways are 
now subjected, and with the expanding civilization 
there must necessarily be some expansion of the 
rules which have been heretofore laid down. In 
some of the decisions it is stated that streets and 
highways are for the purpose of public travel. 
This restricted view is natural, because in primi-
tive time nothing beyond· individual travel was 
even contemplated. As civilization progressed, 
transportation, communication, of messages, and 
many municipal uses, including the product and 
service of the many public utilities which are now 
recognized by Ohio statutes, began to utilize our 
highways. 
"Some distinction is sought to be made be-
tween those uses which were under contempla-
tion at the time the highways were established, 
and those uses which have come into vogue long 
after such establishment, and some distinction is 
made by some of the cases between public and 
private uses. But it is difficult to see how either 
of such distinctions has the sanction of sound 
reasoning. Some of the highways of our state 
were originally Indian paths or paths established 
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by wild animals. By a process of evolution they 
successively became footpaths of the settlers, 
bridle paths, ways for pack animals, ways for 
horse-drawn vehicles, ways for motor-propelled 
vehicles and electric street cars, ways for wires 
for telephone and telegraph service and for the 
transmission of electric energy, ways for pipes for 
water, sewage, gas, steam, hot water, and other 
utilities. 
"Some of the streets of some of our cities 
have been so recently laid out that it can fairly be 
stated that many and all of these uses might well 
have been contemplated. Others of the streets of 
our older cities are established along the lines 
of the original highways, and were laid out at a 
time when none of the modern uses and utilities 
was in vogue, or even known. 
"Can it be said that a different rule should 
be applied to the streets which were formerly the 
early highways, and that as to those streets only 
those uses be authorized which were fairly under 
contemplation at the time they were laid out~ 
Under such a rule it would be necessary first to 
ascertain the date of the establishment of such 
a road and to make a study of the progress of 
civilization up to that time, the result of which 
would be to have a different rule for each street 
and highway. Endless confusion would neces-
sarily arise by drawing a distinction between pub-
lic and private use and between those uses which 
were in contemplation at the time the highways 
were established and those which have come into 
vogue by the later evolution of civilization. 
"The evolution of public utilities and the 
widespread and ever-increasing use of public 
utility service throughout the state have greatly 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
varied the uses of the streets and highways. It is 
doubtful whether this great variety of uses has 
really increased the burdens. The increased bur-
dens upon the highways are caused primarily 
by the largely increased population, and the de-
mands of the people for necessities, conveniences, 
and luxuries of modern living conditions. It has 
been found more economical as well as more 
speedy to transport merchandise and passengers 
by rail, to convey electrical energy for light, heat, 
and power and to transmit messages and informa-
tion by wires, and to convey gas for fuel and light-
ing and water for municipal purposes by pipe 
lines, and other utilities by still other and differ-
ent methods. It is hardly correct to say that by 
such new adaptations the streets and highways 
are subjected to uses not contemplated when high-
ways were laid out many years ago. It would be 
more correct to say that present uses are the 
progression and modern development of the same 
uses and purposes. The new appliances are but 
rapid transit methods of supplying the modern 
wants of the people, the wires supplanting the 
messenger, the carrier and the postman, and the 
rails and pipe lines supplanting in part the ve-
hicular traffic. 
"Inasmuch as one of the elements of this 
controversy involves the use of trunk-line wires 
along Southern A venue, and also involves the fact 
that electric energy is transported through the 
city of Bucyrus for the use of patrons living out-
side and beyond the city, two authorities having 
a bearing upon that question are cited. In the case 
of Cheney v. Barker, 84 N. E. 492 (198 Mass. 356, 
16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 436) decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 1908, the fol-
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lowing is found in the second paragraph of the 
syllabus: 
" 'Since highways are established by 
state authority for the general good, since 
laws of Massachusetts make no distinction be-
. tween them as to rural ways or urban streets 
or otherwise, and since the Legislature has 
supreme authority respecting public rights in 
streets and highways, the Legislature may 
provide for the use of highways, as well for 
through travel as for the through transmis-
sion of gas, water, or other commodities from 
one place to another, regardless of the ques-
tion whether any municipality through which 
the ways may pass, or those who own the soil 
of the ways subject to the public easement 
therein, are served or in any way benefited 
by such use.' 
"In the opinion (84 N. E. on page 494) this 
syllabus is .amplified, and the court cites cases de-
cided by the courts of New York, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts." 
In Huddleston v. Eugene, 34 Ore. 343, 55 P. 868, 43 
L.R.A. 444, the court quotes Elliott on Roads and Streets, 
page 315 as follows: 
"If we have not reasoned ill, a suburban ser-
vitude may not only be· greatly argumented, but 
in a measure, transformed by the demand of the 
public welfare. This conclusion has for its ulti-
mate foundation the old maxium 'that ·regard be 
had for the public welfare is the highest law,' and 
it receives support from the principle that men 
are presumed, when they do an act, to contemplate 
the natural consequences which may result. It is 
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also true that the benefit which the owner of the 
servient estate receives from the increase in 
population and the building up of the city far 
more than compensates h~m for the increased 
burden of the servitude, which these things pro-
duce so that he suffers no damages and without 
damages there can be no right of action." 
Empire Natural Gas Company v. Stone, 121 Kan. 
1119, 245 P. 1058. The case involved the right of Plain-
tiff to lay a gas pipe line in a public highway in the 
county, on which highway Defendant's eight acres abut-
ted, without Defendant's consent. The court refers to Mc-
Cann v. Telephone Company, 69 Kan. 210, 76 P. 870, 66 
L.R.A. 171, and State v. Natural Gas Company, 71 Kan. 
508, 80 Pac. 962, and says: 
"They (these cases) establish the legal right 
of the Wichita Natural Gas Company to lay its 
pipe line in the public highway without the consent 
of the Defendants." 
Nazworthy v. Illinois Oil Company, 176 Okl. 37, 54 
P. 2d 642. The State widened a highway six feet running 
along Plaintiff's property and obtained the six feet from 
Plaintiff. The State permitted Defendant to place a six 
inch oil pipe line in this six feet. Then the State widened 
the highway again and took ten feet of Plaintiff's land 
by condemnation, defendant refusing to give the land up. 
The State then ordered Defendant to move its pipe lines 
over onto this ten foot strip. Plaintiff then brought 
suit for damages as he had not consented to the taking 
of the ten feet or the laying of the pipe line therein. 
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Judgment for Defendant was affirmed. The court refers 
to and relies upon McCann v. Johnson County Telephone 
Company, 69 Kan. 210, 76 P. 870, and Cater v. North-
western Tel. Exch. Company, 60 Minn. 539, 63 N. W. 111, 
quoting from the McCann case as follows: 
"The purpose of the highway is the control-
ling factor. It is variously defined or held to be 
for passage, travel, traffic, transportation, trans-
mission, and communication. It is a thoroughfare 
by which people in different places may reach and 
communicate with each other. The use is not to be 
measured by the means employed by our ances-
tors, nor by the conditions which existed when 
highways were first devised. The design of a 
highway is broad and elastic enough to include 
the newest and best facilities of travel and com-
munication which the genius of man can invent 
and supply." 
The court quotes from the Cater case as follows: 
"If there is any one fact established in the his-
tory of society and of the law itself, it is that the 
mode of exercising this easement is expansive, 
developing and growing as civilization advances. 
In the most primitive state of society the concep-
tion of a highway was merely a footpath; in a 
slightly more advanced state it included the idea 
of a way for pack animals; and, next, a way for 
vehicles drawn by animals--constituting, respec-
tively, the iter, the actus, and the via of the Ro-
mans. And thus the methods of using public high-
ways expanded with the growth of civilization, 
until today our urban highways are devoted to a 
variety of uses not known in former times, and 
never dreamed of by the owners of the soil when 
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the public ease1nent 'vas acquired. Hence it has 
become settled la'v that the easement is.not limited 
to the particular methods of use in vogue when the 
easement "~as acquired, but includes all new and 
improved methods, the utility and general con-
venience of "'"hich may afterwards be discovered 
and developed in aid of the general purpose for 
which high,vays are designed. And it is not mate-
rial that these new and improved methods of use 
were not contemplated by the owner of the land 
when the easement was acquired, and are more 
onerous to him than those then in use. 
"The conclusion reached is that: 'The con-
struction and · maintenance of a telephone line 
upon a rural highway is not an additional servi-
tude for which compensation must be made to the 
owner of the land over which the highway is laid." 
The court then says: 
"These cases may be said to present in gene-
ral the theory or reasoning upon which the cases 
holding generally against the contention of plain-
tiff herein are based. This line of authority holds 
that the rights of the owner of lands in rural 
communities over and along which highways are 
established must yield to the needs of the public 
generally with the expansion and growth of civi-
lization as new methods and means of travel, 
transportation of persons, commodities, etc., and 
transmission of messages, intelligence, etc., are de-
vised, developed, and expanded, notwithstanding 
that the use is more onerous than were the means 
and methods in use at the time the highway was 
laid out, and notwithstanding that the new uses 
include, not only new methods of travel, trans-
portation, and transmission by moving vehicles, 
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etc., but the right to conduct and maintain per-
manent structures in and along the highway for 
improved methods of transportation, etc., by and 
for the benefit of the public in general, limited 
only to the extent that the improved or other 
methods of use do not interfere with the use of 
such highway for general, legitimate use of the 
highway by footmen, horsemen, and vehicles; and 
notwithstanding that such structures are erected 
and maintained by private corporations for pri-
vate gain. This has been referred to by some as 
the 'March of Progress' theory." 
The court then refers to certain statutes to show 
highways may be freely used for oil pipe lines, said 
statutes giving the right to use highways for transport-
ing oil by pipe lines, the right to condemn for a right of 
way for such use and making oil lines common carriers 
and says: 
"and those statutes would seem to declare 
that it is the policy of the State that such use of 
highways, is in furtherance of the general policy 
of the State, to use the highways for the con-
venience of the citizens of the State in travel and 
transportation." 
The court then summarizes the rule which it states 
is the weight of authority and supported by the better 
reasoning as follows : 
"That is, in substance, that the new or dif-
ferent use of the highway, or new or different 
method of transmission or transportation, is but 
a further proper use of the highway in line with 
the general purpose of, highways; that general 
purpose of highways being that subject to proper 
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supervision, they may be used by the public and by 
common carriers for such form of travel, trans-
portation, and transmission as may be in keeping 
with the declared policy of the state; a chief re-
striction being that each such use of the highway 
shall not improperly interfere with the rights of 
others in the use of the same highways. The 
proper use of the highways by oil pipe lines lo-
cated, laid, and maintained under proper super-
vision does not interfere with the various other 
uses of the highways." 
The Plaintiff has cited and placed great reliance 
on the case of Hofius v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Co., 146 
Ohio St. 574, 67 N. E. 2d 429. This case, together with 
prior Ohio cases, Smith v. Central Power Company, 
Supra, and State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit 
County, 123 Ohio St. 362, 175 N. E. 390, should be con-
sidered together and illustrate the greater rights which 
the city or county has in streets created by dedication 
through the platting of a subdivision. The case of Smith 
v. Central Power Company, involved a platting statute 
very nearly identical with our Section 78-5-4, the court 
holding that the abutting owner had no right to object 
to subsurface use of the street for laying a gas main. 
The case of State v. Board of Commissioners of Summit 
County, involved the laying of a sixteen inch water main 
in a highway outside the city of Akron to transport water 
for a sewer district. The court there said: 
"We are not unmindful of the fact that the 
weight of authority, both text and judicial deci-
sion, makes a distinction between the character 
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of the title of the municipality to its public streets 
and the character of the title of the state to pub-
lic highways outside municipalities; that theo-
retically a municipality owns the fee to its streets, 
in trust for the use of the public, and the abutting 
property owners outside municipalities own the 
fee to the highway, subject to the easement of the 
state or the public to use the highway for the 
purpose of travel. The distinction so made is an 
artificial one and not based upon sound logic." 
The Hofius case involved the construction of a water 
main along a county road on which plaintiff's eighty acre 
farm abutted. The court refers to the statement con-
tained in the above quotation which reads, "The distinc-
tion so made is an artificial one and not based upon sound 
logic." As to that statement the court then says: 
"In refering to the distinction between muni-
cipal and rural highways, the writer may have 
had in mind the fact that under the fee theory, the 
abutting proprietor's rights were equitable, while 
under the easement theory such rights were legal. 
But we are of the opinion that there is the further 
distinction that the legal rights are broader. 
"Had the statutory law of the state been ex-
amined it would have disclosed that since the year 
1800 there has been in effect the substance of Sec-
tion 3585 of the General Code (the same Section 
which we quoted from the case of Smith v. Central 
Power Company) which provides: 'The map or 
plat so recorded shall thereupon be a sufficient 
conveyance to vest in the municipal corporation 
the fee of the parcel or parcels of land designated 
or intended for streets, alleys, ways, commons, 
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or other public uses, to be held in trust to and for 
the uses and purposes in the instrument set forth 
and expressed, designated or intended.' " 
The court then held that the fee to county highways 
is in the abutting ovvner and overrules State v. Board of 
Commissioners on that point. The court does not refer 
to the Smith v. Central Power Company case, but it af-
firms the holding in that case by holding that under the 
platting statute the municipality acquires such a fee in 
the platted streets as distinguishes the rights of the 
public in such streets from the rights of the public in a 
mere county road. The Hofius case is, therefore, author-
ity for our contention that under Section 78-5-4 the 
county is vested with a defeasable fee in the streets 
shown in the plat of a subdivision in the county, recorded 
as provided in said section. 
POINT III 
EVEN THOUGH THE ABUTTING OWNER OWNS TO 
THE CENTER OF THE STREET, STILL THE LAYING OF 
THE WATER MAIN IN THE .STREET DOES NOT GIVE 
HIM A RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES OR TO REQUIRE 
ITS REMOVAL. 
In support of this proposition we cite and rely upon 
the following authorities. 
Wood v. McGrath, 150 Pa. 451, 24 A 682, 16 L.R.A. 
715. Defendant obtained permission to lay a private 
drain in a street past the premises of Plaintiff an abut-
ting owner, without his consent. Plaintiff brought suit 
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for injunction to restrain the use of the drain, complain-
ing that it was a nuisance. The court held for Defendant 
saying: 
"But the least consideration will show that the 
right of a private abutting owner has nothing to 
do with the question. It is the extent of the muni-
cipal authority to grant the use of the street for 
a p:rivate purpose that is alone in question, and 
that authority does not depend in any degree upon 
the * * * abutting owner. * * * The conclusion, 
both of the master and court below, was based 
upon the idea that the abutting owner is the 
owner of the fee of the land occupied by the street, 
and the laying of a drain pipe under the street 
without his consent is an invasion of his right as 
owner of the land. How falacious this proposition 
is, is at once apparent when it is considered that 
the right of the public in the streets of cities, 
boroughs, and towns is far more extensive than 
the mere right to use the surface of the land for 
the purpose of passage. * * * It may undoubtedly, 
either by itself, or by its delegated authority to 
others, dig up the soil to lay water pipes, gas 
pipes, sewers, drains, electric wires, telegraph and 
telephone wires, cables, and . doubtless subter-
ranean railways, every one of which uses is in 
direct and exclusive hostility to the abutting 
owners' right in the fee. * * * The streets and 
alleys of cities, towns, and boroughs are under 
the control and direction of these municipalities, 
and they have all the power over them that can 
lawfully exist. They are the universally recog-
nized channels of communication between the dif-
ferent parts of the municipal territory, and no 
private interest in, or ownership of, the subsoil 
is permitted to interfere with the free use of both 
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the surface and the subsoil by the municipal 
authorities, or by their delegated substitutes. Any 
other doctrine 'vould entirely frustrate all bene-
ficial uses of the public streets and alleys of the 
cities, towns, and boroughs of the commonwealth. 
It is clear, therefore, that the adjoining owners 
have no interest in the subsoil of the street which 
will enable them to demand that their consent 
must be obtained before any uses of the subsoil 
of the streets can be made." 
Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 324 Mich. 527, 37 N. W. 
2nd 625. This case involved the right of the city to con-
struct an underground auto parking garage under the 
boulevard without compensating the abutting owners for 
such additional use. The court quotes with approval 
from Detroit City Railroad v. Mills and Breitmeyer, 85 
Mich. 634, 48 N. W. 1007 : 
"Whatever may have been the ancient adju-
dication limiting the rights of the public in the 
streets to passage and repassage, and whatever 
now may be the rule with regard to highways in 
the county, with the growth of population in our 
city have come increased needs for heating, light-
ing, drainage, sewage, water, etc., and with these 
has come also a corresponding extension of the 
public rights in the streets. Immense sewers and 
water mains may be dug and the soil removed, 
culverts and drains constructed, without compen-
sating the abutting owners. It may now be con-
sidered the well settled rule that the streets of a 
city may be used for any purpose which is a neces-
sary public one and the abutting owner will not be 
entitled to a new compensation in the absence of a 
statute giving it. So far then as these Defend-
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ants are concerned, it is immaterial whether they 
or the city own the fee in the street. Their rights 
are the same in either case. So long as they are 
unobstructed in the use and enjoyment of their 
property having convenient ingress and egress 
and the use of the street is an authorized and 
proper public use, they have no legal cause for 
complaint." 
Beale v. Town of Takoma Park, 130 Md. 297, 100 A 
379. The court says : -
"The use of streets for supplying the inhabi-
tants of a town with water is not an additional 
servitude, and the adjoining owner, although he 
holds the fee to the center of the street, is not 
entitled to compensation as for a new servitude, 
for it is not such, but only a proper or necessary 
use incidental to a street in a populace place. 
Three Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th Ed.) 
Section 1212; Three McQuillin on Municipal Cor-
porations, Section 1344. 'The condemnation or 
dedication of land for use as a street or highway 
in a city or town, or in close proximity thereto, 
carries with it the right to use the highway for 
the laying of gas and water pipes, since that is one 
of the purposes for which such highways are used, 
and is within the scope of the easement.' " 
Stout v. Frick, 62 S. W. 2nd 1057. The court quotes 
from Gaus and Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, K. & M. Ry. 
Co., 113 Mo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 18 L.R.A. 339 as follows: 
"I think it may be safely affirmed that all 
the authorities to which we have been cited by 
counsel on both sides of this case agree that when 
the public acquires a street, it may be applied to 
all uses consistent with and not subversive of, 
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the proper uses of a street and not inconsistent 
"\Yith the uses contemplated in the dedication, 
grant or condemnation; and it is only when the 
street is subjected to a new servitude, inconsistent 
with or subversive to its use as a street, that the 
abutting property owner can complain." 
Ga~ts &Sons Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis K. & N. Ry. Co. 
113 nfo. 308, 20 S. W. 658, 18 L.R.A. 339. This was an ac-
tion to enjoin Defendant from laying a double track in 
Main Street in St. Louis and operating the same along in 
front of Plaintiff's property. Plaintiff had a mill, sash 
and door manufacturing plant facing Main Street, the 
only access to which was over main street to haul in 
and haul out materials. It was alleged that the double 
tracks to be laid by Defendant would not leave sufficient 
space to permit standing wagons to load and unload with-
out danger of collision with Defendant's engines and cars, 
that the street would be destroyed as a public thorough-
fare, and there was danger of fire, and the smoke, noise, 
and vibration damaged Plaintiff's property. The court 
said: 
"The inquiry to be made is whether the dam-
ages thus inflicted are such as are contemplated 
by Sec. 21, Article 2, of the State Constitution, 
which ordains that, 'private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation.' The question is whether laying 
the railroad track in the street on grade under 
municipal authority, and operating the road in 
the usual manner, was applying the street to a 
new public use, which requires payment of com-
pensation for damages to the property, or whether 
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doing so was merely exercising by authority a 
right which had resided with the public since the 
dedication of the land to public uses. When land 
is dedicated generally, and without restrictions, or 
condemned, for a public street in a town or city, 
the street, and persons who purchase and improve 
the property thereon, hold their property rights 
subject to all the uses to which the street can be 
lawfully subjected by the public. New uses in the 
improvement in the mode of travel and transpor-
tation are constantly arising. When there is no 
restriction of the public use, new modes of use 
may be adopted which are consistent with the 
proper use of the street, without the consent of 
abutting owners, though such new uses may inter-
fere somewhat with their own convenient use of 
the street. 
"The public use was fixed when the street 
was granted or dedicated. The License granted by 
the city to the Defendant to lay its track upon the 
streets and run engines and cars thereon in the 
transportation of passengers and property, was 
not a re-dedication to a new and distinct public 
use, but was a mere License to use it in a way 
contemplated by the owner of the land when he 
subjected it to such uses. The lots were purchased, 
held and improved, not only in view of the advan-
tages of the street, but also subject to the burdens 
of all consistent public uses which the increasing 
wants of the public might thereafter demand. 
Plaintiff has shown no ground for injunction." 
People v. Kewanee Light & Power Co. 104 N. E. 680, 
262. Ill. 255. This was an action filed by the Attorney 
General on relation of the City of Kewanee and a num-
ber of its citizens and real estate owners, seeking to 
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enjoin Defendant from maintaining various gas mains 
and pipes now in the streets of the city. The city had 
granted a franchise to Defendant's predecessor in inter-
est. A statute was enacted prior to the granting of the 
franchise, providing that the city's right to permit laying 
of gas mains in streets was subject to the owners of 
more than one-half the frontage on the street petitioning 
for such permission. Such petition has not been filed. 
By its demurrer the Defendant raised the constitution-
ality of this statute. The court held the statute unconsti-
tutional as being discriminatory between persons install-
ing water pipes and other pipes and gas pipes. The court 
says: 
"The subject of legislation involved in the 
act under consideration was the power of city 
councils over the streets. Prior to the passage 
of the Act the Legislature had given to city coun-
cils power to establish streets and regulate their 
use, and the openings therein, for the laying of 
gas and water mains and pipes. The City Council 
might grant the use of the streets, alleys and 
public grounds of the city for the laying of gas 
or water mains, or the erection and maintenance 
of electric wires for lighting, or for telegraphs or 
telephones, without regard to the consent or 
wishes of abutting property owners." 
Ober v. City of Minneapolis, 179 Minn. 495, 229 N.W. 
794; Defendant brewing company o·wned two buildings 
facing on a public alley and separated by Plaintiff's 
vacant lot. The brewing company had obtained the right, 
through an ordinance of the city, to convey heat, light, 
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steam, and other utilities under the alley, the city to re-
ceive five per cent of the gross receipts. The brewing 
company did not put in pipes but made a tunnel under 
the alley to connect the two buildings and put in a con-
veyor to convey bottles from one building to the other. 
At the time Plaintiff brought this action to recover pos-
session of the tunnel in front of her property the brew-
ing company had ceased to use the tunnel. The court held 
for Defendant brewing company and city, saying: 
"The ordinance on its face amounts to no 
more than a license to subject the subsurface of 
the alley to the ordinary street uses. Conduits 
for light, heat, and power, like sewers and water 
pipes, are now generally placed under the surface 
of public streets and are not considered as impos-
ing additional servitude or burdens on the fee 
than those intended by the dedication. The public 
easement is not confined to the mere surface of 
the land dedicated as an alley or street. Appel-
lant truly says: 'Water mains, sewers, gas pipes, 
play their part as an auxiliary to the one time 
wagon supplying those needs ; and the use of such 
for public service are embedded as closely to the 
surface as reasonably practicable. * * * Use varies 
with form. The essence of travel in locomotion.' 
But we cannot agree to this claim or conclusion: 
'Manifold as to mode, manner and method is its 
use; fixedly unalterable is its place-the highway, 
upon and not under or above it.' Cater v. North-
western Telephone Exch. Co., 60 Minn. 539, 63 
N. W. 111, 28 L.R.A. 310, 51 Am. St. Rep. 543, 
supports the first statement quoted, but rejects 
the last, and so does Coburn v. New Telephone 
Co., 156 Ind. 90, 59 N. E. 324, 52 L.R.A. 671; Pea-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
37 
body v. Boston, 220 Mass. 376, 107 N. E. 952, L. 
R. A. 1915F, 1005; McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions (2d Ed.) Sec. 1448, and authorities there 
cited.'' 
While it is true the cases cited above- involve city 
streets, we wish to reiterate that under Section 78-5-4, 
the rights held by the public in the streets dedicated 
by the filing of the plat of a subdivision are identical 
whether the street is in a city or in a county outside an 
incorporated city or town. The statute says the fee shall 
vest in the county, city or town for the public uses named 
or intended. The title and rights of the county in the 
streets are precisely the same as the title and rights of 
the city in the streets. We feel, therefore, that the author-
ities cited, though they involve city streets, are pertinent 
and controlling. 
CONCLUSION 
When the subdivisions herein involved were platted 
and the plat filed of record, the owners passed the fee 
to the streets to the county for all public uses. So far 
as this case is concerned, the public uses are defined by 
statutory provisions, that is to say, the legislature has 
said that "water mains, sewers and sewer pipes may be 
laid" in the highways, by permission of the county com-
missioners. In a limited sense that was a legislative de-
claration of what the courts had already decided-that 
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the uses to which highways may be put must be allowed 
to expand as the demands and needs of the public require. 
The Plaintiff in this case has no vested right to 
put water or gas mains in these two streets. He too must 
secure the consent of the county commissioners to in-
stall such facilities. He stands in the same position as 
the Defendant City. He simply owns certain lots of 
specified dimensions, length and width, which dimensions 
do not include any part of the street. He acquired these 
lots by lot number. The statute requires that the plat 
must show the exact dimensions of each lot. His use of 
the street as an abutting owner or as a member of the 
public is in no wise interfered with, as the water main, 
under the statute, must be buried deep enough to keep the 
roadway secure. 
When the owner of land creates a street in a platted 
subdivision, he knows he is giving the county the streets 
that are therein shown and that such streets can be used 
for any purpose authorized by law. He accepts that 
result and, presumably, accepts it on the theory that the 
benefits accruing from the subdividing will afford full 
compensation. To permit him, or his successor in in-
terest, to prevent a lawful use of the street, except upon 
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penalty of paying compensation, is to unjustly enrich him 
at the expense of the public. We respectfullly submit that 
the judg1nent of the lower court is correct and should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, . 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assistant City Attorneys, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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